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ePUF: A Lightweight Double Identity Verification in IoT
Bo Zhao, Pengyuan Zhao , and Peiru Fan
Abstract: Remote authentication is a safe and verifiable mechanism. In the Internet of Things (IoT), remote hosts
need to verify the legitimacy of identity of terminal devices. However, embedded devices can hardly afford sufficient
resources for the necessary trusted hardware components. Software authentication with no hardware guarantee is
generally vulnerable to various network attacks. In this paper, we propose a lightweight remote verification protocol.
The protocol utilizes the unique response returned by Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) as legitimate identity
basis of the terminal devices and uses quadratic residues to encrypt the PUF authentication process to perform a
double identity verification scheme. Our scheme is secure against middleman attacks on the attestation response by
preventing conspiracy attacks from forgery authentication.
Key words: Internet of Things (IoT); Identity-Based Encryption (IBE); Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)

1

Introduction

In recent years, the Internet of Things (IoT) has been
the most popular concept and product of developments
in information technology. By 2020, more than 50
billion terminal devices are expected to be connected
to the internet[1] . One key challenge in the safety of
IoT is the vulnerability of ending devices in defending
numerous attacks or intrusions. In IoT, sensor devices
are often exposed in the environment that are out of
control. Thus, their functioning is easily influenced
by various factors such as environmental issues and
malicious attacks. Compared with traditional concepts
of security, IoT broadens and amplifies the traditional
attack surface. One of the most common intrusions in
IoT is impersonation attack[2] . An attacker can pretend
to be a legal device to steal or tamper with sensitive data.
Such an attack will greatly cut down the accuracy of
the data on the IoT. Therefore, how to correctly identify
sensor devices is a major concern for the security of
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IoT[3] .
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have provided
an effective and low-cost mechanism to solve
the aforementioned problem. Accordingly, some
authentication protocols based on such technology have
been proposed in several studies[4–6] . However, these
PUFs are vulnerable to modeling attacks as shown in
many actual scenes[7–9] . Especially, the corresponding
communication protocols are not immune to Man-InThe-Middle (MITM) attacks. In IoT, an adversary can
easily intercept the challenge sent by a sensor node
(prover) and pretend to be the legal ending device. Thus,
authenticating the identity of an ending device with PUF
is a primary task of ensuring secure communication in
IoT.
Traditional authentication protocols using PUF
described have inherent limitations[10] . In enrollment
of the sensor stage, the Trusted Third Party (TTP) stores
a large number of Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs) in
its database. To avoid an MITM replay attack, once the
CRP is used, it is removed from the database. Although
this protocol provides a good solution for using a PUF
as primitive authentication evidence, an effective keyexchange mechanism is absent if the former protocol
is used independently, thereby creating an obstacle.
Another major reason for why it is unsuitable for the
IoT environment is that this protocol does not scale well
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with the huge number of sensor devices in IoT, because
the database is required to store a very large number
of CRPs[11] . The maintenance cost is always on a high
point because when a device’s CRP in the database is
depleted, a new enrollment is necessary for the particular
device.
Furthermore, using the traditional key exchange
mechanism to protect the PUF authentication process is
not suitable for IoT. Diffie-Hellman[12] method cannot
distinguish identity, so it cannot prevent MITM attacks;
it is also prone to CRP leakage at the sensor node. To
resolve this, many communication protocols use the way
of storing certificates in sensor devices[13, 14] . Although
this method can ensure the integrity of the keys, the
actual deployment is difficult. The reason is that in the
enrollment phase, it is almost impossible of ensuring that
the certificate embedded in the Non-Volatile memory
(NV) of the sensor is exactly the server’s certificate
when sensor and server (verifier) are deployed in IoT;
thus, a highly complicated certificate issuing mechanism
is needed. Another main reason for not applying it in
IoT is the limited computing and storage capability of
sensor nodes. Furthermore, the certificates stored in NV
are vulnerable to attacks and can be easily replaced by
attackers because of poor self-protection capability of
the sensor devices.
In this paper, we propose a new terminal
authentication scheme based on PUF in the IoT
environment. Encrypted Physically Unclonable Function
(ePUF) is a protocol that utilizes a double identity
verification using device feature information Meta Data
of Sensor node (MDS) and PUF. We adapt an identitybased encryption scheme that utilizes quadratic residues
to encrypt the PUF authentication process. The scheme
that we propose is simple, lightweight, and flexible. This
scheme has the following characteristics:
 Suitable for IoT: The authentication protocol
proposed in this paper does not need to store certificates
in sensor nodes, nor does it need to store large amounts
of CRP on the server. Instead, only a small amount of
public information is stored in the sensor node, and the
server only needs to store one CRP for each terminal
device. Sensor devices can be flexibly connected to any
server, which is in accordance with the characteristics of
easy access and flexibility of IoT.
 Secure in key exchange: When a server needs to
create a session key between the sensor node and itself, a
seed of the session key can be issued from the server
to the sensor node. According to the algorithm, the key
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will not be exposed to the adversary.
 Trustful in authentication: In our authentication
scheme, the server sends a challenge of PUF that is
encrypted to the sensor node. The CRP is never revealed
to the outside. Therefore, it is trustworthy in considering
that the response from the sensor device can represent
its real identity. The identity legitimacy of IoT terminals
is guaranteed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 reviews the related work on using PUF as
authentication and typical session key exchange scheme.
Section 3 introduces the principle of PUF and identitybased encryption scheme based on quadratic residues.
Section 4 describes the process of our key exchange
protocol and improvement of the referenced algorithm
in detail. Section 5 analyzes the protocol to prove the
security and robustness. Section 6 presents the evaluation
design and experimental results. We conclude the paper
with a discussion of limitations and potential future work
in Section 7.

2

Related Work

Since the advent of PUF technology, a great deal of
improvement has been observed in PUF and the design
of security communication framework by leveraging
it. Rührmair[15] discussed a recent cryptographic
primitive termed SIMulation Possible, but Laborious
(SIMPL), which is a type of strong PUF coming with
a publicly known, individual numeric description that
allows slow simulation and output prediction. Another
strong PUF-based authentication protocol has been
proposed in the past, such as controlled PUF[16] , which
reduces the number of CRPs used to protect against
modeling attacks. To avoid Denial Of Service attack
(DOS), Özttextürk et al.[17] presented a noisy PUF
that introduced a random parameter called time stamp,
through which the server can keep track of the sessions
running between two communicating and Katzenbeisser
et al.[18] presented a reconfigurable PUF protocol that
implemented a pseudo-random number generator[19, 20]
to counteract impersonation and also used the timestamp
to prevent the protocol.
Kocabaş et al.[21] proposed a converse PUF-based
authentication that is secure against passive and active
attacks by providing an extensive security analysis
against passive adversaries and a concrete instantiation
using controlled arbiter PUF. Moriyama et al.[22]
proposed such a PUF-based authentication protocol
under complete memory leakage. Their protocol was
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further adapted by Aysu et al.[23] by reversing generating
and copying programs to improve the adaptability to
lightweight devices at the cost of introducing pre-secrecy
secrets.
However, the existing PUF security protocols have
certain limitations. Some studies have reviewed eight
prominent proposals in chronological order: from the
original strong PUF proposal to the more complicated
converse and slender PUF proposals[24] . Other studies
have surveyed different ultralightweight authentication
protocols designed for Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) authentication[25] . Zhang et al.[26] proposed a
lightweight PUF-based and cloud-assisted authentication
mechanism for multi-hop body area networks.

3
3.1

Background Knowledge
Physical unclonable function

A PUF is a noisy function that is embedded into a
physical object, such as an integrated circuit. The
concept of PUF was first introduced by Pappu et
al.[5] Creating a copy of the PUF in a physical way
is believed to be an impossible mission so that an
attacker cannot forge an identical challenge-response
behavior. The structure in products is unclonable,
even by the same manufacturer. Gassend et al.[27]
introduced silicon PUFs, which aim to exploit the
uncontrollable manufacturing variations that are inherent
properties of the Integrated Circuits (IC) fabrication
process. Today, several security products are based
on PUF in the market, such as PUF-enabled RFID
chips and proposals for Internet Protocol (IP) protection
and anti-counterfeiting solutions[28] . PUFs’ physical
basis is noise (e.g., thermal noise), so when they are
queried with the same challenge, their responses are
typically slightly different. These output changes can be
eliminated by using fuzzy extractors[29] , and the methods
can be efficiently implemented on resource-constrained
devices. Based on the assumption that PUF and PUF’ are
different, PUFs can be considered to have the following
properties[30] :
 Independence: When the two PUFs are queried
with the same challenge x, PUF and PUF0 will definitely
return two different responses y and y 0 .
 Robustness: When a PUF is queried many times by
the same challenge x, a close to 100% likelihood is that
it returns the same responsey.
 Pseudo-randomness: Physically distinguishing a
PUF by any pseudo-random function is infeasible.
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 Tamper-evidence: Any attempt to tamper with the
physical features of PUF is futile, i.e., PUF can no
longer be evaluated but is turned into a random PUF0 ,
PUF¤PUF0 .
3.2

Identity-based encryption scheme based on
quadratic residues

An identity-based encryption system includes a function
that uses one unique identity (for example, a person’s
email address) to create the encryption key, thereby
avoiding the complex scheme of creating a separate
public key. The possibility of such a scheme was first
proposed by Shamir[31] , but it has proved difficult to
implement the above assumption because of absence
of practicality and safety. Thereafter, Boneh and
Franklin[32] proposed an implementation based on
elliptic curves, by which we can discuss the possibility
of applying this mechanism to the actual environment. In
this study, we adopt another identity-based cryptosystem
that uses quadratic residues modulo a large composite
integer[33] .
The basic element of the system is a product M of
two big primes P and Q, which are held privately by an
authority; P and Q are both congruent to 3 mod 4[31] .
However, M is a universally available public modulus.
By contrast, P and Q are not public and only possessed
by an authority. Also, the system turns a universally
available secure hash function into an identity-mapping
calculation.
Our innovation is based on the theory that although
some basic parameters are public in the entire key
exchange process, they do not affect the security of
the session key. The attacker cannot calculate the key
through the existing captured parameters. Therefore, no
public key is required to protect the session keys.
The key exchange system is simply described as
follows: In the network, an entity’s unique identity
represents an encryption “seed” by some types
of unidirectional hash functions. The authority is
responsible for creating the “seed”, which is called value
a , and the a modulo the general public modulus
 aM
satisfies the character in which the Jacobi symbol
  M
a
a
is C1. We can conclude that
D
D C1,
P
Q
a
which has the same result as
, so a is a square
M
modulo of both P and Q , thus a is a square modulo
M [33] .
At the same time, a is issued to the authenticator, and
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the authority also creates a value v, which must satisfy
the following:
vDa

M C5 .P CQ/
8

mod M

(1)

It is noted that both M and a can be public, on the
contrary, v is a private value and only the authority can
possess it, since only the authority itself can calculate
the square root modulo of M . Such v will satisfy v 2 
a mod M .
In key exchange phase, if an entity wants to
communicate to another securely, it must generate a
session key first to encrypt the data through symmetric
encryption. From the original design, the entity sends to
the recipient each bit of the session key in turn as follows:
We consider ki as a single bit of the session key, which
i D 1; 2; : : : ; n, coded as 1 or 0 corresponding to the
Jacobi symbol C1 or 1. For each ki , the transmitter
selects a value t at random
modulo M , such that the

t
Jacobi symbol
equals ki . Then the transmitter
M

a
sends w D t C
modM to the receiver[33] .
t
In order to ensure the secure communication between
the two parties, the authority (also as the recipient of
w) issues the value v secretly. After accepting w, the
authority calculates to recover the bit ki according to
Formula (2):

v 
v
w C 2v D t 1 C
 1C
mod M
(2)
t
t
It follows the Jacobi symbol:

  
w C 2v
t
D
D ki
(3)
M
M
As only the recipient knows
 the value
 v, he can
w C 2v
calculate the Jacobi symbol
and hence
M
recover each ki .
The largest feature of this mechanism is that no public
key is used, and the generation and distribution of keys
are relatively simple. We consider this mechanism to be
highly suitable for IoT in regarding sensor nodes as the
transmitter and servers as the receiver.

4

Protocol Description

The typical infrastructure of protocol consists of several
sensor nodes and a server node. Sensor nodes are
“tentacles” of IoT because they are responsible for
collecting data from the environment and data sources.
The server node is responsible for verifying the
trustworthiness of data submitted by the sensor nodes.
We can simply assume that a certain number of sensor
nodes is directly connected to a server node and any

single sensor node only submits its data to a specific
server. Each sensor node and server node embeds a
PUF instance in its device, which is used to authenticate
the device identity. We will describe our scheme with
respect to the sensor and server nodes. For simplicity,
we focus on the identity authentication and secure
communication between the sensor and server. However,
the scheme can also extend to the superstructure of IoT.
The phases of our proposed scheme are described in
Fig. 1. For convenience, we call the sensor node the
prover and the server node the verifier, respectively.
4.1

Enrollment phase

Initially, an enrollment phase is executed. In this phase,
when each sensor node (prover) is in the manufacturing
stage, a PUF instance is embedded in it, and one
Challenge and Response (CR) pair is created and
stored in the TTP’s CRP database, which is severely
protected. Also, some device-inherent properties during
the manufacturing process are also enrolled in the
database, such as device ID, type, and production data.
We call them MDS. These data can be used as assistant
data in the PUF verification phase. To avoid revealing
sensitive information, the database also stores a hash
code of these messages, which are also stored in the
prover. In our scheme, these messages can be read by
each prover accordingly.
4.2

MDS verification phase

When a prover needs to communicate with the verifier,
it must show its identity first. The detailed steps are
described as follows: A prover sends its hash code of
identity messages to the verifier, and the verifier goes
through the database to compare the code. If the code is
correctly compared, it shows that the MDS is enrolled
in the previous phase correctly and has a legal device
identity. Then, the verifier fetches the MDS string and
produces
 a  value a modulo M such that the Jacobi symbol
is C1, which applies the hash function to the MDS
M
string. Typically, this process can be implemented with
multiple structured applications of the hash function to
produce
 a  a set of candidate values for a , until the value
D C1 is found. Then, the verifier sends a to the
M
prover through a public or unencrypted manner, that is,
the value a can be exposed to the outside. We do not need
to worry about the integrity of a. The specific security
analysis will be discussed in the next section.
Besides sending the value a to the prover, the verifier
also produces a square root modulo M , which is called
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CRP
v

Data Base (DB),

Formula (1)
Kn

mod

PK

t

t

PK

t

PK t

PK t

K
KC

C
KR

v

Formula (2)
p
p

R

Fig. 1

Remote attestation based on physical functions.

the value v. The method of producing v follows Formula
(1). Such v will satisfy v 2  a mod M . It is noted
that only the verifier can calculate the value v because
only the verifier holds the prime factors P and Q, v is
severely protected by the verifier and only the verifier
can access and use it.
4.3

Session key creation phase

After receiving the value a, a prover needs to create a
session key to encrypt the next communication process
and send it to the verifier safely. In the original design[33] ,
the prover sends to the verifier each bit of the transport
key in turn. However, we consider it as error prone and
inefficient. Thus, we adjusted the bit stream and replaced
it with a structured byte package. The prover creates a
session key, let x be a single bit of it and coded as C1 or
1. Then the prover selects a value
at random modulo
 t
t
M , such that the Jacobi symbol
equals x and the

M
t Ca
prover calculates w D
mod M for every x.
t
After finishing the calculation to every bit of the session
key, the prover packs all of the x with the following
format, as shown in Fig. 2. Each number w is allocated
4 byte of a fixed length. At the end of the last w, 4byte-long data with all 1 bits are attached, because in
our calculation scheme, any meaningful number should
be a positive integer. A timestamp follows so that the

Fig. 2

Structure of session key package.

verifier can identify the exact time that the package was
created. At the end is a hash summary value for all the
bytes ahead to guarantee the integrity of the package.
After packing all the bytes, the prover sends the package
to the verifier.
4.4

PUF verification phase

When the verifier receives the session key package,
it decodes each bit of the key using the value v,
which is only processed by itself. Formulae (2) and
(3) indicate
 that the
 verifier can calculate the Jacobi
w C 2v
symbol
D ki , and therefore recovers x.
M
Then, the verifier fetches the PUF challenge from the
CRP database and sends it to the prover encrypted by
the recovered session key. If the returned response is
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matched, then the prover is a legitimate device and its
data can be trusted. Otherwise, the submitted data should
be viewed as suspicious or untrusted. The goal of this
phase is to authenticate the unique identity of every
enrolled device. As in the entire process, the CRP is
always encrypted, so we can conclude that the CRP can
represent the legal identity of every sensor device in IoT.
The preceding phases have the following two
purposes:
(1) Effectively validating the identity of all sensor
devices connected to IoT. To achieve this goal, we design
a dual mechanism using MDS information and PUF
authentication. As the MDS and seed a are not encrypted
in the transmission, we utilize MDS information to
generate a session key and use the latter to protect CRP in
the PUF verification phase. According to the algorithm
in Ref. [23], although the MDS and the seed a are
public, the attacker cannot calculate the session key, as
is discussed in the next sector.
(2) Generating and exchanging session keys for secure
communication. Besides encrypting the CRP, the session
key can also be utilized in future data transmission from
the sensor node to the server. The duration of session
keys can be freely determined by the IoT environment
according to the actual circumstances. In the most
rigorous conditions, the session key can be regenerated
every time. It can also be used for a longer period to
sacrifice part of security in exchange for efficiency.

5

Security Analysis

In this section, we provide a security analysis of the
session key exchange protocol that is described in the
previous section. To prove the security of the protocol,
we describe some attack models that probably appear
in the scene assumed in this paper. We consider two
different attack models as described in the following:
 Malicious PUF model. In this model, we assume
that after the enrollment phase, the attacker forges a PUF
by embedding a PUF simulator in the integrated circuit
or tampers with the PUF of a senor node by replacing
it with malicious or untrusted PUFs. The purpose of
these actions is to impersonate legitimate PUFs to obtain
encrypted keys communicating with server nodes.
 Session key security model. In this scene, we
assume that all of the sensor nodes (prover) and servers
(verifier) are trusted without enduring any attack. The
attacker either eavesdrops on the communication link
without tampering with the messages (e.g., packet
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sniffing) or has full control over the link and can modify
the messages (e.g., packet injection or re-routing attack).
Theorem 1. If the enrollment phase in our scheme is
operated in a secure environment as we have assumed
previously (that is, the CRPs cannot be leaked to the
adversary), then our device authentication scheme is
secure in the malicious PUF model. No attacker can
forge a device that can be successfully verified.
Proof. The cryptographic security of our proposed
authentication scheme is based on the uniqueness of
the PUF. Suppose an attacker wishes to obtain a legal
device identity, i.e., a CRP. As we assume that the
entire process in which the manufacturer instantiates
the CRP for a particular chip is in an absolutely
safe environment, it is impossible for the adversary
to obtain a legal device identity in the enrollment
phase. In other words, the attacker has to forge a
device D 0 using the chip replication technology or PUF
simulator to be successfully verified in the authentication
phase. According to the inherent property of PUF, the
uniqueness metric is defined as
n
n
X
X
2
HD.Ri ; Rj /
Uniqueness D
100%
n.n 1/
n
i D1 j Di C1

(4)
where HD.Ri ; Rj / is the Hamming Distance (HD)
between the responses of i -th and j -th PUFs embedded
in two chips for a particular challenge C and n is the
total number of chips under our consideration, so k  n
is the total amount of response bits of the PUF. The
metric is used to calculate the Hamming distance of a
PUF instance .Ri ; Rj / .i ¤ j /, which is for the same
set of applied challenges[14] . In this paper, we use U
to represent the uniqueness. The ideal value of the
uniqueness metric is 50%. According to the inherent
property in PUF, given n responses, which is represented
by Ri by each, there is no efficient clone procedure that
can build another physical PUF device R0 in which the
HD between the R0 and any other Ri is less than 2U ,
i D 1; 2; : : : ; n.
Now suppose that a device R0 can be successfully
verified. According to the theory, the HD between the
evaluation result of PUF in R0 and any other Ri is less
than 2U: This can follow in two cases. First, if the
response in R0 is equal to any legal one, then the attacker
has successfully cloned a PUF instance. It is obvious
that this is a violation of basic physical theory of PUF.
Second, if the PUF is in R0 2 .R1 ; R2 ; : : : ; Rn /, then
it shows that the attacker successfully forged a PUF in
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R0 such that the output of R0 has Hamming distance
less than 2U from any output of Ri . According to the
uniqueness of PUF, this is also an impossible situation.
This feature of the PUF circuit embedded in the chip
provides the ability to be uniquely identified from the
same type of PUF instance.
Theorem 2. If an attacker can control the
communication between the sensor device and the server
but can obtain neither the session key nor the seed r
from the server or the sensor node, then although the
attacker can eavesdrop or modify all of the packets at
the verification phase, the session key is still considered
safe and will not be leaked to the attacker.
Proof. Our verification mechanism focuses on two
points:
(1) Effectiveness of sensor device authentication;
(2) Security of session key transmission.
In our scheme, we designed a dual authentication
mechanism using MDS and PUF. In the MDS
verification phase, the prover sends the hash code of
the MDS to the verifier, who then searches its database
to obtain the MDS string for generating the value a
which is transmitted to the prover. MDS has never been
exposed to the outside, so we can recognizance it as
safe. As the hash of MDS is public in the network, the
possibility of an attacker obtaining it and thus posing
as a legitimate node cannot be excluded. To avoid this
situation, we design a second verification, which is in
the PUF verification phase. The PUF challenge, which
is only possessed and sent by the verifier, is encrypted
in this action. Thus, we can conclude that as long as
the session key used to encrypt the PUF challenge is not
grabbed by the attacker, the returned response by the
prover is true and credible.
Our method focuses on the security of session
keys. Our key exchange algorithm is based on the
cryptosystem that uses quadratic residues modulo a
large composite integer. Thus, one way to destroy this
security mechanism is to determine the decomposition
factor of M . As M is publicly distributed, it is
M C 5 .P C Q/
also feasible for
to generate the
8
exponent used to compute square roots. However, this
is not our concern. We only consider an active attack
against each bit of session key. For general consideration,
we suppose that an attacker can recover every bit of the
session key from the package without knowing either r or
the factors of M . Under this consideration, the attacker
may compute the following map:
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F .M; a; w/ ! x D

t
M


(5)


a
where w D t C
modM for t .
t
Then we consider when an attacker obtains the value
a; what the value
 a of
 F could be evaluated where the
Jacobi symbol
is C1, but a is not a square. So the
M
 
a
a
Jacobi symbols
and
will both be 1. If t
P
Q
is the value used to calculate s, there will be three other
values t1 ; t2 ; and t3 giving the same value of w. These
are given by
a
t1  tmod P; t1  mod Q
(6)
t
a
t2  t mod P; t2  mod Q
(7)
t
a
t3  tmod P; t3  mod Q
(8)
t
 
 
 
a
a
t1
t2
as
D
D 1, then
D
D
P
Q
M
M
 
 
 
t
t3
t
D
. So, there is no unique
M
M
M
 
t
to recover, as F cannot return
correctly more
M
than half the time whenever a is not a square. Hence,
we wouldhave a procedure that can distinguish the two
a
cases of
D C1; that is, determining whether a
M
is a square or a non-square without factoring M . This
is the quadratic residuosity problem which is currently
unsolved, and also is a problem on which a number of
other public key systems are based.
The original encryption scheme is vulnerable to
an adaptive chosen cipher text attack. As the prover
transmits x that represents one bit of the session key at a
time, an attacker may intercept the original x and forge
another one and send it to the verifier. This process does
not expose secret messages. By using x 0 provided by
the attacker, the verifier cannot restore the forgery key
expected by the attacker through its own R: However,
it can destroy the next authentication process. To avoid
this situation, we have improved the transmission of the
session key by appending a hash digest of the entire
package. Furthermore, a time stamp can help the verifier
judge the facticity of the received session key. If the
distance between the timestamp and the current time is
beyond a normal threshold, then the verifier has reason
to suspect whether the packet is tampered with by an
attacker.
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6

Evaluation

latform

This section presents the evaluation of our scheme
using real Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM)
PUF devices. We have implemented the full verification
steps of our scheme. As our scheme is based on the
physical property of CRP uniqueness of PUFs, we do not
need extensive modifications in the embedded chip and
most parts of our scheme are implemented on software.
The goal of our evaluation is to validate whether our
protocol can provide safe and correct authentication
while also adapting to the limited computing and storage
capabilities of terminal devices. In particular, we want to
verify that our scheme is robust even under the targeted
attack model that is mentioned in Section 4. A device
authentication scheme should be robust even when
terminal devices have no protection in the environment.
Our main target is to use PUF for device
authentication. Thus, we use the PUF instance for
each ALINX board as implemented in the AX7020
board containing an XILINX Zynq7000 SOC chip.
This method leverages Advanced RISC Machine
(ARM)CField Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
System On Chip (SOC) technology and integrates dualcore ARM Cortex-A9 and FPGA programmable logic
on one chip, which is connected to the particular board.
We consider its parameter suitable for the identity of
an IoT device. In this evaluation, we use PC as the
server and implement a CRP database that is deployed
on a PC to store CRP for each of the IoT devices in the
enrollment phase. At the authentication phase, the PC
sends the challenges to the ALINX board through WiFi
and the board applies the challenge to FPGA, collects
the response, and sends it back to the PC.
 Implementation in FPGA. We first implement
the SRAM-based ePUFs on the FPGA platform
to authenticate its usability as a hardware security
foundation. Figure 3 presents the infrastructure of the
development platform, which has two components: the
PC as verification server and an FPGA board equipped
with SRAM PUFs. The host PC is responsible for
maintaining a database for storing CRPs and MDS with
its related information. In the verification phase, the
host PC creates the seed a and restores the session key

Fig. 3

Architecture of FPGA platform.

k from the PUF. The PUF is responsible for receiving a
and generating the session key k.
 CRP databases. The CRP database is stored and
maintained in a PC verifier and the CRP for each PUF
is generated using SRAM PUF during the enrollment
phase. Compared with the original CRP mechanism,
our database does not need to store a large number
of CRPs but can satisfy the specific security needs in
different scenes. Two problems occur in using SRAM
PUF to extract keys: (1) The response of SRAM PUF is
different between the same chip because of the influence
of ambient noise and (2) the initial power value of SRAM
is not evenly distributed.
To solve these problems, we introduce a fuzzy
extractor model[34, 35] . The function of the extractor is to
obtain the same output from two input data with minimal
difference, and the output data have a good uniformity
distribution.
In this design, we use SRAM start address
0x10000000 size 580-bit continuous storage unit as seed
value of BCH coding and start address 0x10001000 size
4096-bit continuous storage unit as SRAM identification
code to generate system keys. MDS data are stored in
the start address 0x0800000 size 4095-bit continuous
storage unit.
Example of CRP database is shown in Table 1, we
can conclude that taking the No.1 CRP message as an
example in the MDS fragment, we select some IoT
device model label strings to simulate different PUFs.
In every device, we choose the same SRAM memory
location to generate a session key. The key after the

Table 1

Device
Device 1
Device 2
Device 3

Example of CRP database.
MDS
Challenge
Apexis-camera-APM-J011-2018-2
0x10001000 0x100011FF
TP-Link-WiFi Smart-plug-HS100
0x10001000 0x100011FF
Netatmo-weather-station-with wind-gauge
0x10001000 0x100011FF

Response
0xA6995421: : : B3014525
0xCCFb2024: : : D93022157
0x6682F2A1: : : A8C33362
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Fig. 5

Complexity comparison in concurrent number.

We obtained the maximum and minimum difference rates
of response between every two PUFs. As shown in Fig. 6,
the average difference rate between 40 SRAM PUFs is
0.4774 and the standard deviation is 1.1%. The average
value is extremely close to the ideal value of 0.500. Thus,
we can consider SRAM PUF as unique.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a new terminal authentication
scheme based on PUF, which applies double identity
verification using device feature information and PUF
unique CRP. We adapt an identity-based encryption
scheme that uses quadratic residues to encrypt the PUF
authentication process. The scheme that we propose is
simple, lightweight, and flexible and is suitable for IoT.
Considering the experiment results, we believe that most
of the current terminal devices can use PUF technology
to perform authentication. These devices also have secret
key generation and conversation functions.
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